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 In 2017, President Moon Jae-in endorsed the development and acquisition of a nuclear submarine for the Republic of Korea (ROK—South Korea). South 
Korean proponents of nuclear submarines favor the program for two technical 
reasons. First, nuclear submarines can stay underwater for months, rather than 
the days or weeks of which conventional diesel-electric submarines are capable. 
Second, nuclear submarines can maintain speeds of up to forty knots at depth, 
whereas nonnuclear submarines have difficulty sailing much above twenty knots 
at depth for any significant duration, and must surface frequently to recharge 
their batteries—which makes them easier to detect. These two attributes, South 
Korean nuclear-submarine proponents argue, make nuclear submarines ideal for 
detecting and neutralizing the ballistic-missile submarines of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK—North Korea).1
Since Moon’s 2017 endorsement, South Korean interest in developing an 
indigenously designed nuclear submarine only has grown. Recent press reports 
indicate the intention of the ROK Navy (ROKN) to modify three KSS-III sub-
marines (of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class) into four-thousand-ton nuclear-
powered submarines.2
Doing so would constitute a major commitment. Not only would the addition 
of nuclear power to the final three submarines in 
the class impact the defense budget severely, but 
South Korea also would have to find a reliable, 
long-term fuel supplier. South Korea has nuclear-
fuel purchase agreements with the United States, 
but for civilian applications only. In press reports, 
unnamed military sources assert that once the 
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United States agrees to supply low-enriched uranium for naval use, the develop-
ment process will be a breeze.3 This claim glosses over the complexities associated 
with and the many difficulties involved in building nuclear submarines.
Acquiring nuclear submarines would dictate the establishment of a dedicated 
line of funding that would affect other ROKN programs—a significant trade-off. 
This immediately raises the question of the relevance of nuclear submarines’ 
general operational advantages to South Korea’s specific needs, since the regional 
waters in which its navy operates are relatively shallow. In addition, South Korea 
must consider the legal aspects of promoting a nuclear-submarine program. Can 
the Moon administration negotiate with nuclear-fuel suppliers to acquire the 
necessary enriched fuel to power a nuclear-submarine fleet? South Korea likely 
would have to renegotiate the existing South Korean–U.S. “123 agreement” if it is 
to use purchased, enriched fuel for military purposes.4
Given the pros and cons of acquiring nuclear submarines, South Korea should 
consider alternatives. The ROKN is updating its surface and underwater fleets 
with highly capable antisubmarine warfare (ASW) systems. The ROK can rely 
on the United States to support state-of-the-art airborne ASW assets to enhance 
the ROKN’s capabilities to detect, track, and, if necessary, prosecute hostile sub 
threats. The Moon administration may seek to create and foster cooperative ASW 
agreements with Japan, the United States, or both. Given its highly technical 
economy, South Korea might invest in technologies—drones, lasers, magnetic-
anomaly detection, artificial intelligence (AI)—that could enhance all facets of 
FIGURE 1
NATIONAL CLAIMS TO SEA-LANES IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Source: Terence Roehrig, “South Korea: The Challenges of a Maritime Nation,” National Bureau of Asian Research, 23 December 2019, www.nbr.org/.
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ASW. Nuclear submarines’ high costs would permit acquisition of a very limited 
number of them, whereas the same money could purchase substantially greater 
nonnuclear ASW capabilities. Finally, nuclear submarines typically operate as 
ASW platforms, whereas the alternative surface and air assets can perform mul-
tiple missions beyond ASW.
THE EVOLVING NORTH KOREAN THREAT
North Korea left the Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003 and tested its first nuclear 
weapon in 2006. Between 2009 and 2016, the Kim regime tested four additional 
nuclear devices, then announced that the final one had been a thermonuclear 
device with an estimated 250-kiloton yield. Throughout the testing period, North 
Korea continued to refine its nuclear warhead miniaturization to enable integra-
tion onto a missile.5
As the Kim regime refined its nuclear-warhead designs, it also developed 
more-capable missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). 
Under the guise of a peaceful space-launch-vehicle program, the DPRK even-
tually developed and tested the Hwasong-15 ICBM. The Hwasong-15, with 
a range of nearly thirteen thousand kilometers (km), can threaten the entire 
FIGURE 2 
TEST LAUNCH OF HWASONG-15 ICBM
Source: “Hwasong-15 (KN-22),” Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project, 7 December 2017, missilethreat.csis.org/.
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continental United States. After the successful testing of the Hwasong-15, 
North Korean state media claimed that the country had “finally realized the 
great historic cause of completing its nuclear force.”6 The inference is that the 
United States, not South Korea, is the deterrence objective of these strategic-
weapon systems.
North Korea’s supplement to land-based nuclear missiles has been its devel-
opment of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In 2015, it began 
testing its SLBMs, culminating in the launching of four missiles in 2016. After a 
hiatus of three years, in 2019 North Korea launched a new-generation SLBM, the 
Pukguksong-3, with a range of 1,900 km.7
North Korea possesses a submarine fleet of over seventy vessels, but most are 
of relatively obsolete designs from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s. Construction 
of North Korea’s first indigenous missile submarine, the Sinpo class, wrapped 
up in late 2014. However, the base design is still relatively antique compared 
with current attack submarines available to South Korea and Japan. South Ko-
rean analysis indicates that the Sinpo-class missile submarine may have just one 
vertical-launch tube for SLBMs.8 And while North Korea does possess missile 
submarines, it still must master the challenge of ejecting and launching an SLBM 
from an operational submarine.
North Korean short- and intermediate-range missiles already accomplish 
deterrence against any South Korean incursion or attempt to eliminate the 
FIGURE 3
ESTIMATED RANGES OF DPRK MISSILES
Source: Nicole Mortillaro, “‘Just a Matter of Time’: North Korea’s Missile Capabilities May Be Closer Than Once Thought,” CBC, 30 November 2017, 
www.cbc.ca/.
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Kim regime. The addition of ICBM and SLBM capabilities represents a deter-
rent aimed not at South Korea but at the United States. Thus, for South Korea, 
a nuclear-powered submarine is an unnecessary luxury, not a clear military 
requirement.
THE SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR-SUBMARINE ANSWER
South Korean nuclear-submarine proponents claim that nuclear submarines are 
the most effective counter against a nuclear-capable missile submarine from the 
DPRK or any other hostile state. The South Korean press has reported that the 
proposed South Korean nuclear-submarine fleet would consist of a minimum of 
three boats. The belief is that having three will guarantee the capability to keep at 
least one at sea continuously.9
The cost estimates for the three submarines plus their supporting infrastruc-
ture approach $9 billion, excluding operating costs.10 For fiscal year 2020, the 
South Korean defense budget totaled approximately $41.3 billion, of which $13.7 
billion was set aside for arms purchases.11 South Korea already has begun to over-
emphasize the advantages of nuclear-powered submarines to justify spending so 
much on the program (see sidebar).
Retired ROKN captain Moo Keun-sik claims that basic designs for the sub-
marine and a miniaturized nuclear reactor were completed during the “326 
initiative.”12 This was a secret development program started in 2003 but shut down 
FIGURE 4
DPRK SINPO-CLASS BALLISTIC-MISSILE SUBMARINE
Source: Sy Gunson, “Is the West Coast of the United States Vulnerable to North Korean Submarines Carrying Nuclear Weapons?,” Quora, n.d., www 
.quora.com/.
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after it was exposed to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Korean 
public. Captain Moo’s projections seem overly optimistic, considering that basic 
designs for USN submarines take up to four years to create, with an additional 
nine years needed to complete the detailed design.13 “Five years is the minimum 
time frame to complete South Korea’s first nuclear-powered submarine, even with 
outside assistance, naval experts project”; even this counts only production, not 
actual entry into service.14 Yet how long it might take Seoul to acquire nuclear sub-
marines is perhaps the least of the problems its submarine-acquisition effort faces.
SOUTH KOREAN OBSTACLES TO A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE
Assuming the ROKN’s acquisition price (without supporting infrastructure) 
is between $1.6 and $2.5 billion for each proposed nuclear submarine, Seoul 
may need as much as $7.5 billion to build just three submarines. However, 
Nuclear-Powered Submarine Advantages
The greatest advantage the nuclear submarine offers is its ability to remain underwater and 
on station for months at a time without surfacing; in fact, a nuclear submarine can stay sub-
merged for its entire deployment. It never needs to surface to recharge batteries, as a diesel-
electric submarine must do periodically. The only time the nuclear submarine must near the 
surface is for critical communications between the submarine and higher authorities.
ROKN nuclear submarines could use either low-enriched uranium (LEU) or high-enriched 
uranium (HEU) fuel. If the submarine is LEU fueled, its operational period generally encom-
passes five to ten years without refueling. The ROK design could incorporate features like those 
of French nuclear submarines, which refuel with 6 percent LEU every ten years.
If the nuclear submarine is HEU fueled, the option exists for the entire nuclear-submarine 
fleet never to require refueling, which is a complex and time-consuming operation. However, 
the drawbacks are a dramatic increase in the cost per ship and the substantial proliferation risks 
associated with weapon-grade fuel.
Regardless of the type of nuclear fuel used, the limiting factor for the nuclear submarine 
is crew endurance; while the nuclear submarine can provide fresh water and oxygen, it must 
return to port to replenish food stores. To increase the operational tempo of the nuclear-
submarine fleet, the ROKN could employ the USN nuclear-missile-submarine doctrine of two 
independent crews per ship. This enables the ship to spend a greater amount of time at sea 
and the crews to recover from a highly stressful job.
The nuclear submarine’s ability to transit long distances at high speed permits the boat to 
meet far-flung operational needs. Britain’s Royal Navy (RN) used this feature to great effect 
during the Falklands War. The RN nuclear submarines had to traverse the length of the Atlantic 
in a timely manner to establish a sea-denial zone against any Argentine navy interference with 
British naval vessels attempting to land ground forces. This illustrated that the nuclear subma-
rine can project force anywhere on the globe; however, unlike those of the United Kingdom 
and the United States, the ROK government does not have far-flung possessions or allies it 
must protect.
A major technical advantage the nuclear submarine possesses over the diesel-electric boat 
is its available electrical power for warfare systems. The nuclear submarine provides a constant 
source of electrical power that will not diminish over time, unlike the battery bank of a diesel-
electric boat during submerged operations. This power source enables the nuclear submarine 
to maintain all sensors for detecting and tracking hostile submarines. The associated penalty is 
a submarine of greater size and complexity than the diesel-electric boat. The reactor compart-
ment requires additional space and increased buoyancy to counteract reactor weight.
The nuclear submarine’s advantages in extended underwater operations, available power 
density, technical prestige, and operational tempo make it suited for worldwide operations—
but the ROKN’s area of operations is regional, not global.
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operationally the navy will need as many as nine nuclear submarines to protect 
its regional sea-lanes, as it cannot deploy all its submarines simultaneously; gen-
erally, at any one time half of a submarine fleet is undergoing maintenance, crew 
rest, and retraining—activities separate from tracking adversary submarines.
Thus, a realistic nuclear-submarine fleet for South Korea would be six to nine 
submarines. That could cost as much as $22.5 billion. The Moon administration’s 
planned budget for 2019 was approximately $415 billion, which included nearly 
$42 billion in defense spending. Money spent acquiring nuclear submarines 
might be spent better on missile defense, air forces, ground forces, or reinvest-
ment in the national economy.15
More important, South Korea will need to overcome several additional struc-
tural barriers to build its nuclear submarines.
Shipbuilding Infrastructure
South Korea is the number one shipbuilder in the world, but that is of civilian 
ships, not warships. Adding a nuclear-submarine program to the ROK defense 
budget would require additional workers trained in the design, development, and 
production of these highly complex vessels. In addition, the shipbuilder would 
have to isolate and secure construction facilities dedicated solely to the nuclear-
submarine program, to ensure the security of the related nuclear technology and 
materials.
The major shipbuilders in Korea are Daehan Shipbuilding, Samsung Heavy 
Industries, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME), and Hanjin 
Heavy Industries & Construction (HHIC). Of these four, only DSME and HHIC 
build military vessels, and both build military and civilian vessels in the same 
shipyards. Currently, DSME is constructing the ROKN’s conventionally powered 
submarines.16
South Korea would require dedicated port facilities for its proposed nuclear-
submarine fleet. The ROKN could convert existing harbor facilities or develop a 
new site. Either way, the Moon administration will require infrastructure funding 
in addition to the submarine-construction funding.
Design and Construction
South Korean shipbuilders also must develop the design parameters for mar-
rying a nuclear reactor with a submarine hull. Toward this end, designers will 
need educational facilities to teach nuclear-reactor operations and design. The 
U.S. Navy has identified the following eight characteristics as being critical to 
submarine design.
 1. Compactness: Reactor must fit within the space and weight constraints of a war-
ship, leaving room for weapons and crew, yet be powerful enough to drive the ship 
at tactical speeds for engagement or rapid transit to an operating area.
7
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 2. Crew protection: Crew lives and works for months at a time in close proximity to 
the reactor.
 3. Public Safety: Ship makes calls into populated ports throughout the world. 
Maintaining national and international acceptance demands the most  
conservative engineering and operational approach toward assuring safety of 
the public.
 4. Reliability: Ship requires continuous propulsion and electrical power to be self-
sufficient in a hostile and unforgiving environment—undersea, under ice, in 
combat.
 5. Ruggedness: Reactor must tolerate ship’s motion and vibration, and withstand 
severe shock under battle conditions.
 6. Maneuverability: Ship may require rapid and frequent power changes to support 
tactical maneuvering.
 7. Endurance: Reactor must operate many years between refuelings, ideally for the 
life of the ship, to minimize life-cycle cost, minimize demand on support infra-
structure, minimize occupational radiation exposure, and maximize ship avail-
ability to the fleet for service at sea.
 8. Quietness: Submarines must be extremely quiet to minimize the threat of acoustic 
detection and to be able to detect other ships.17
To field a capable nuclear-submarine fleet, South Korean designers would 
have to address each of these characteristics equally and become proficient in 
them. To quote a 1995 report from the USN reactor-design community, “Failing 
to satisfy any of [these requirements] would make the reactor unusable in the 
ship, or would compromise the safety and survivability of the ship and its ability 
to carry out its mission,” potentially putting the crew in danger.18
The warfare systems incorporated within a nuclear submarine should inte-
grate seamlessly with the ROKN’s current diesel-electric fleet. The designers 
would have to be cognizant of the increased electrical power available within a 
nuclear submarine, as well as the need for effective distribution of that power to 
the warfare systems and the increasingly advanced sensors to be incorporated in 
future hulls and modernizations.
Another consideration is retaining the workforce knowledge base once con-
struction of the nuclear-submarine fleet commences. Maintaining a knowledge 
base sufficient to accomplish future upgrades requires an effective strategy to 
extend workforce stability over the long term; if the government predicates its 
strategy on a service life of twenty-five to thirty years before the nuclear sub-
marine is replaced by a new generation, it must develop plans to maintain that 
trained design workforce for decades.
8
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The ROKN and its associated shipbuilder must overcome other construction 
constraints. Unlike the current construction requirements for conventional sub-
marines, a nuclear-submarine program would have much greater safety require-
ments, to deal with special nuclear materials and the possibility of accidental 
release of radioactivity via irradiated fuels.
South Korea could learn from the U.S. Navy’s experiences with submarine 
construction. Owing to design and construction errors, the U.S. Navy experi-
enced a tragic accident in the sinking of USS Thresher (SSN 593) with all hands 
during trials in 1963. Out of that experience came implementation of the Sub-
Safe program. SubSafe establishes a strict quality-control regime that is external 
to the shipbuilder and the program office overseeing construction.19 South 
Korea would need such a program if it were to pursue a nuclear-submarine 
program.
To fulfill the requirement for trained submarine designers, the nuclear-
submarine shipyard would have to compete against the public shipyards for 
trained construction personnel. Generally, private-sector jobs pay more than 
their public-sector equivalents. For a program of national-security interest, the 
nuclear-submarine shipyard would have to offer comparable salaries and the 
incentive of contributing to the well-being of the nation.
The government would need not only a skilled ship-construction workforce 
but also a skilled workforce for the infrastructure required to construct, house, 
maintain, and eventually dispose of the nuclear-submarine fleet.
Logistics and Training
The ROKN would need to develop new logistics methods for handling nuclear 
fuel. Transport and storage facilities would be needed to minimize nuclear- 
submarine maintenance periods. A secure source of nuclear fuel would be es-
sential. At a minimum, South Korea would need to renegotiate with the United 
States the two nations’ agreement regarding peaceful nuclear cooperation, and 
build both a uranium-enrichment plant and a fuel-fabrication plant.
Then there is the classroom training required for nuclear-submarine sailors. 
In the U.S. Navy, such training takes a year to complete. To conduct this train-
ing, the ROKN would need an onshore training reactor in a facility convenient 
to the nuclear-submarine fleet. Any modifications, updates, or other changes to 
the ships’ reactors would need to be replicated on the training reactor to ensure 
that the sailors train on equipment that is the same as that in the fleet. To gain 
superior proficiency operating a naval reactor, USN sailors require three years on 
the job; the ROKN and its sailors, being new to nuclear operations, might need 
even more time.
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Disposal
Unlike conventional submarines, which can be dismantled at a scrapyard, nuclear 
submarines require special facilities to handle irradiated materials. The reactor 
core and the reactor vessel demand facilities designed to remove and transport 
them safely.
The ROKN should review the disposal issues that both Russia and the United 
Kingdom are experiencing with their decommissioned nuclear submarines. 
Both nations are struggling to dismantle their out-of-service submarines—spe-
cifically, the removal and storage of the reactor core and associated irradiated 
materials.20
Prioritization
Any delay, regardless of cause, creates a potential technology gap between the 
fielded nuclear submarine and the adversary’s submarine capabilities. South Ko-
rea can learn from Brazil’s experience by ensuring dedicated long-term funding. 
Defense specialist Bernardo Wahl G. de Araújo Jorge notes that in addition to 
Brazil’s budget constraints, the delay that country has experienced in completing 
its own nuclear-submarine project has been caused by difficulties with mastering 
the fuel cycle needed to support nuclear propulsion.21
South Korea may not experience the same learning curve, since unlike Brazil 
it possesses extensive experience in modern shipbuilding and, more important, 
more nuclear-engineering expertise. But while it already has an advanced nuclear- 
power industry, it does not enrich nuclear fuel, and at present nuclear propulsion 
is not within South Korea’s shipbuilding repertoire.22 Understanding the signifi-
cance of this issue is important; South Korea would have to make the acquisition 
of a nuclear submarine a national priority, with full government backing irre-
spective of changes in administrations.
Nuclear-Material Agreements
The biggest obstacle to Seoul’s acquisition of a nuclear submarine is nuclear fuel. 
South Korea does not have an indigenous uranium supply, so it imports most 
of its fabricated uranium fuel from the United States. South Korea renewed its 
civilian nuclear cooperative 123 agreement with the United States in 2015. The 
agreement prohibits the ROK from using U.S.-supplied uranium for any military 
purpose, but permits Seoul to enrich uranium up to 20 percent for civilian ap-
plications, if Washington gives its consent. South Korea could purchase fuel from 
alternative suppliers, such as China, France, and Russia, but all three have similar 
peaceful-use requirements.23 If South Korea is unable to obtain the necessary 
enriched uranium from a foreign source, the alternative would be indigenous 
enrichment, which would break its nuclear cooperative agreements by diverting 
enriched uranium to the nuclear-submarine program.
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Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
If the ROK government authorizes an enrichment program, denuclearizing the 
peninsula will become more complicated. Ostensibly, achieving that is a major 
goal of the South Korean government.24
In the April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, Kim Jong-un and President Moon 
stated that North and South Korea would implement fully their previous agree-
ments and declarations. “The previous 1992 South/North Denuclearization 
Declaration is clear: ‘South and North Korea shall not test, manufacture, produce, 
receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. South and North Korea 
shall use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.’”25 North Korea clearly is in 
violation of this agreement.
SOUTH KOREA’S BEST RESPONSE
The ROKN possesses several very capable ASW platforms that provide a greater 
return on investment compared with a limited nuclear-submarine fleet. For the 
funds it would take to create and maintain a nuclear-submarine fleet, the Moon 
administration instead could purchase more of the current mix of available ASW 
assets. Likewise, making additional funds available could enable pursuit of new 
technologies that would provide ASW coverage over a greater swath of territory 
within the region.
Current Assets
The ROKN’s surface ships rival those in the surface fleets of many of the great 
powers in their ASW capability, augmented by decades spent developing coop-
erative tactics with the U.S. Navy. The ROKN can purchase more ASW capability 
within such a multidimensional program than it could by expending scarce de-
fense funds on a single ASW dimension. Historical precedent shows that diverse 
assets overcome a focus on one kind of asset—even nuclear submarines.
Surface Naval Combatants. The ROKN currently fields the Incheon-class guided- 
missile frigates. At present they are configured for the surface-warfare mis-
sion but can be upgraded to accept antisubmarine rockets as well as land- 
attack missiles. At a cost of only $250 million per ship, the ROKN could acquire 
multiple highly capable ASW frigates for less than the cost of a single nuclear 
submarine.26
The new Daegu-class guided-missile frigates incorporate ASW systems specif-
ic to countering the DPRK threat. The ships incorporate antisubmarine missiles, 
torpedoes, and sonar systems, at a per-ship cost of approximately $300 million.27
The ROKN currently is building and fielding the Sejong the Great class of 
destroyers. This class provides the ROKN with a true blue-water capability, plus 
an important upgrade to its ballistic-missile-defense capability. At approximately 
11
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$925 million per ship, the Sejong the Great destroyers provide an extensive ASW 
suite of weapons and sensors. The ship can store and launch 128 missiles con-
figurable for missile defense, land attack, or ASW. It also carries two helicopters 
for use in ASW operations.28
The cost per ship is significantly less than that of a nuclear submarine, while 
the ship provides an extra capability of ballistic-missile defense that a nuclear 
submarine cannot deliver.
FIGURE 5  
ROK NAVY DAEGU-CLASS FRIGATE
Source: Xavier Vavasseur, “HHI Launches Fourth Daegu-Class FFX Batch II Frigate for ROK Navy,” Naval News, 29 April 2020, www.navalnews.com/.
FIGURE 6 
ROK NAVY SEJONG THE GREAT–CLASS DESTROYERS
Source: USN photo, ID 100707-N-0260R-039
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Airborne ASW. To integrate fully all dimensions of ASW warfare, the ROKN re-
quires airborne assets that can operate and integrate with the surface and subsurface 
fleets. The United States has a very capable aircraft, the P-8A Poseidon, that can per-
form integrated ASW missions. The P-8A has a patrol radius of 1,200 nautical miles, 
with a capability to remain on station for four hours. It carries up to eleven torpe-
does and 120 sonobuoys. The P-8A also can monitor up to sixty-four sonobuoys and 
relay their data to integrated fleet units for prosecuting hostile submarine contacts. 
For the U.S. Navy, “the P-8A Poseidon and [ASW helicopter] MH60R Seahawk are 
a formidable team that holds at risk the surface and subsurface adversary to allow 
our carrier strike groups and joint forces access and freedom to maneuver.”29 The 
cost for this capability is $125 million per aircraft. In 2018, the U.S. State Depart-
ment approved the sale of eight Poseidons to South Korea, at an estimated cost of 
$2.1 billion.30
While the P-8A is a land-based asset, the MH-60R or equivalent helicopter 
is sea based. Both ROKN frigates and destroyers can operate ASW helicopters 
from their decks. Having a helicopter enables a frigate or destroyer to increase its 
coverage area during ASW operations. The MH-60R can carry up to three ASW 
torpedoes and twenty-five sonobuoys, and it contains the advanced airborne low-
frequency dipping sonar, which has both passive and active capabilities. The unit 
cost for the MH-60R is approximately $40 million per aircraft.31
Combining air assets with surface ships and submarines would enable the 
ROKN to detect and prosecute hostile nuclear-armed missile submarines across a 
much greater area than would be possible with a single nuclear submarine at sea. 
Source: “Restoring the UK’s Maritime Patrol Aircraft Capability (Part 2),” Navy Lookout, 4 April 2017, www.navylookout.com/.
FIGURE 7 
USN P-8A POSEIDON DEPLOYING MK-54 AERIAL ASW TORPEDO
13
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Combining new technologies, such as drone systems and AI, with existing ROKN 
assets would increase the probability of detection of hostile submarines even further.
Nonnuclear Submarines. The ROKN submarine fleet consists of the Jang Bogo 
class and the Sohn Won-il class. Both classes use diesel-electric propulsion, and 
each submarine has eight torpedo tubes. The Sohn Won-il boats have an endur-
ance capability of eighty-four days; the Jang Bogos, fifty. Although a nuclear 
submarine can boast of significantly higher endurance figures, these satisfy the 
requirements of regional patrol operations. Additionally, at approximately $300 
million per conventionally powered attack submarine, the ROKN could acquire 
a greater number of submarines to enable continuous patrol operations in its 
regional security zones.32
The ROKN is in the process of constructing the new Dosan Ahn Chang-ho 
class of submarines. Significantly larger than previous ROKN submarines, this 
class incorporates an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system. AIP provides 
greater underwater endurance than that of previous diesel-electric submarines. 
While the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class boat is larger, it has two fewer torpedo 
FIGURE 8  
MH-60R DEPLOYING DIPPING SONAR
Source: John Keller, “Navy Awards $65.8 Million Order to Raytheon to Provide 22 Helicopter Dipping Sonar Systems,” Military Aerospace, 16 November 
2015, www.militaryaerospace.com/.
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tubes than previous ROKN submarines; however, it has the added capability of 
vertical-launch missile cells. The per-ship cost of this class, at approximately $900 
million, is still significantly less than that of a nuclear submarine.33
Not only are the existing ROKN submarines capable of performing ASW 
missions at a fraction of the cost of nuclear submarines, but they offer a quieter 
operating platform. Detecting radiated noise is the key method for detecting 
submarines themselves, and thus avoiding potential attack by them. The quieter 
the submarine, the more difficult the ASW mission. While operating on electric 
power or AIP, a submarine is nearly undetectable by an adversary. In 2015 joint 
exercises, Sweden demonstrated the AIP’s advantage “when HMS Gotland, a 
Swedish AIP submarine, ‘sank’ many U.S. nuclear fast-attack subs, destroyers, 
frigates, cruisers, and even the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) aircraft carrier in 
joint exercises.”34
FIGURE 9 
ROK NAVY JANG BOGO–CLASS SUBMARINE AT SEA
Source: USN photo, www.cpf.navy.mil/.
FIGURE 10 
ROKN DOSAN AHN CHANG-HO FIRST-IN-CLASS SUBMARINE ON SEA TRIALS
Source: Xavier Vavasseur, “ROK Navy’s 1st 3000 Tons KSS-III Submarine ‘Dosan Ahn Chang-ho’ Passes Max Depth Test,” Naval News, 27 August 2019, 
www.navalnews.com/.
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Future Assets
Technology continues to reduce or eliminate ASW handicaps. The increased use 
of drone and autonomous systems can limit exposure of personnel and increase 
coverage of vast swaths of the ocean. New technologies open avenues in ASW 
by making submarines “visible” and reducing the threat of surprise. Improved 
computers also increase the effectiveness of ASW sensors through their ability to 
crunch vast amounts of data and provide actionable information to military and 
political decision makers. South Korea has a highly technical economic infra-
structure that can exploit these new technologies at a much lower cost than that 
of a nuclear-submarine program.
Drones. Current drones consist not only of aerial but also of surface and under-
water types. The aerial drone commonly used for ASW is the MQ-4C Triton. 
While it does not possess offensive weaponry, it does carry a powerful multi-
function active sensor, with an active electronically scanned array radar. As the 
Triton has a thirty-hour endurance at a speed of more than three hundred knots, 
this drone can monitor large areas using radar or magnetic-anomaly detection to 
locate submarines of potential adversaries. At a cost of $125 million per copy, the 
ROKN could purchase plenty of Tritons to cover important sea-lanes at a fraction 
of the cost of a single nuclear submarine. Also, the Triton is fully interoperable 
with all other military assets, enabling the immediate sharing of intelligence. An 
additional advantage of the Triton is that it uses commercial, off-the-shelf archi-
tecture, which means that upgrading the operating system is less complex, mak-
ing it easy to keep up with the latest technological advances.35
One example of a surface drone is the Liquid Robotics Wave Glider, which 
costs approximately $300,000 per copy. The Wave Glider can host several pay-
loads and underwater sensors to detect hostile submarines and provide connec-
tivity among underwater vessels and surface or air units for complete, multidi-
mensional ASW. The wave- and solar-powered Wave Glider has approximately a 
one-year endurance, and can maintain its location within a thirty-meter radius. 
As the Wave Glider has an extremely low profile, it is ideally suited for monitor-
ing hazardous waters, providing early detection and data relay to quick-response 
aerial assets for prosecuting hostile submarines in times of crisis.36
Teledyne’s Slocum G3 Glider operates underwater, using the energy in ocean 
waves to move in a sawtooth pattern up and down in the sea. At only $125,000–
$150,000 per copy, this autonomous vehicle provides yet another method of de-
tecting and communicating the locations of hostile submarines. When operating 
in swarms, Slocum Gliders can provide coverage over large ocean areas, reducing 
the requirement for manned-vessel sorties. The Slocum Glider is easy to operate 
using web-based navigation and has an endurance range measured in days or 
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FIGURE 11  
DEPICTION OF MQ-4C TRITON CONDUCTING SURFACE SCANNING FORWARD OF FLEET
Source: Northrup Grumman, “MQ-4C Triton Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS),” technical datasheet, World 
Defence News, 29 September 2012, worlddefencenews.blogspot.com/.
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months, depending on payload and mission. Each time the glider surfaces, it can 
transmit its data and receive new task orders as needed.37
New unmanned surface vessels (USVs) continue to advance through testing 
phases, with deployments following within three to five years. Specifically, the 
U.S. Navy’s Sea Hunter is a fully autonomous surface vessel that has the capability 
to navigate the seas without human input. Equipped with the latest towed-array 
sonar systems, the Sea Hunter can assist in detecting hostile submarines. Its 
relatively small and low profile reduces its radar signature compared with those 
of manned surface vessels. The Sea Hunter has an endurance of thirty to ninety 
days, depending on sea conditions, transit speed, and payloads. At approximately 
$36 million per ship, the Sea Hunter provides a very-low-cost alternative to 
nuclear submarines. Its daily operating costs are a fraction of those of manned 
surface vessels. In the future, the Sea Hunter could be outfitted with missiles for 
attacking hostile submarines or surface vessels, with the attack decision remain-
ing with a remote human operator.38
Sensor Technologies. Ships, planes, and drones are only as effective as the 
ASW sensors they employ or those located elsewhere that provide data to the 
command-and-control (C2) network. Continual development provides new sensor 
FIGURE 12  
DEPICTION OF SEA HUNTER USV IN SUBMARINE-HUNTING ROLE
Source: Alexander M. G. Walan, “Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) (Archived),” Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, n.d., www.darpa.mil/.
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systems designed to detect and prosecute hostile submarines. Early detection 
would contribute to the ROKN’s ability to track and counter hostile submarines, 
and during a crisis to prosecute an attack on them. Several different types of sys-
tems hold great potential for reducing further the missile-submarine threat.
The Deep Reliable Acoustic Path Exploitation System (DRAPES) deploys a 
stand-alone system of sonar arrays onto the seafloor to listen to the ocean. The 
advantage of seafloor-based arrays is that they are not subject to weather effects. 
The arrays can communicate submarine contacts along the array chain back to 
the shore-based C2 facility. DRAPES will assist the U.S. Navy in tracking down 
“one lone submarine amid vast swathes of oceans.”39 Implementation of DRAPES 
or a similar system would provide the ROKN with early-warning detection and 
tracking of DPRK missile submarines, obviating the need to sacrifice a significant 
portion of the ROK defense budget to a nuclear-submarine program.
During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy deployed the Sound Surveillance Sys-
tem (SOSUS) to monitor and track Soviet submarines, but changes are afoot.
Two next-generation, fixed-position detectors—the Transformational Reliable 
Acoustic Path System (TRAPS) and the Fixed Distributed System—are replacing 
existing SOSUS sensors. The TRAPS passive array sonar system relies on big data 
and advanced signal processing, which provide greater performance over the old 
SOSUS system and active sonar. “These use large arrays of detectors with a much 
smaller range to filter out other ocean noise and focus on signals from ‘even the 
quietest submarines at natural chokepoints in the ocean.’”40 South Korea is situ-
ated near natural oceanic choke points through which an adversary’s nuclear-
armed missile submarines would have to transit.
Historically, among ASW sensors, those of the acoustic type have predominat-
ed; however, new advances in laser technology may offer alternative submarine- 
detection methods. The U.S. Navy is experimenting with light detection and 
ranging (lidar) technology. Blue-light, solid-state lasers operating on a 455- 
nanometer wavelength detect submarines effectively. “[C]ompact LIDAR 
sensors aboard submarines and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) 
may vastly improve sub-to-sub detection.”41 If the ROKN were to marry this 
technology to a fleet of UUVs, it could monitor effectively any likely hostile 
nuclear-armed missile submarine in transit to the ocean. Once it had detected 
the submarine, the ROKN could dispatch the necessary ASW forces to deal 
with the threat.
Another nonacoustic technology that holds promise for submarine detection 
is advanced magnetic anomaly detection (MAD). Submarine detection near 
the ocean surface already uses existing MAD technology; what is new is the 
increased availability of big data and the computers necessary to process those 
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data. For example, “[w]hen a pair (or more) of MAD sensors move across an area, 
magnetic gradiometry—the mapping of magnetic signatures—is enabled. With 
an array of sensors capturing multiple axes, continuous streams of data can be 
processed by advanced computer algorithms which filter out natural fluctuations 
in electromagnetic fields.”42
A final nonacoustic sensor is in the development process. Actually, it was the 
whiskers of seals that provided the model for this new development. “The passage 
of a submerged vessel creates small whirlpools, called a Karman vortex street. 
. . . When struck by a vortex, the whiskers vibrate, with the input from several 
telling [the] seal the approximate size, bearing, and velocity of the target.” As 
submarine-generated vortices can last for hours, a large window is open for any 
pursuer to pick up the submarine’s trail.43 This type of sensor will be ideal for use 
in congested waters and natural choke points, but will be limited to submarine 
trailing; it will not pick up submarines from the side or front, as there is no ability 
to detect the vortex until the submarine passes over the detector.
The rapid development in the technology of acoustic and nonacoustic sen-
sors could provide the ROKN a better return on investment than a nuclear-
submarine program. Advances in miniaturization, powerful computing systems, 
and unmanned systems mated with AI may provide the best protection against 
hostile submarine threats to South Korea. “If [sensor systems are] developed and 
deployed, significantly advanced non-acoustic detection technology can increase 
a nation’s [ad]vantage to monitor their surrounding waters for adversary attack 
vehicles.”44
Cooperative ASW. ASW exercises that the NATO Centre for Maritime Research 
and Experimentation (CMRE) conducted in February–March 2020 and again in 
the same months in 2021 illustrated the advantages of multidimensional ASW 
in the detecting and tracking of submarines. CMRE deployed numerous passive 
sensors on autonomous vehicles, buoys, and seabed devices off the coast of Sicily 
prior to the start of the exercise. For active submarine hunting, CMRE focused on 
the concept of multination multistatic ASW, “where an active sonar source would 
create pings for dozens or hundreds of passive sensors.” The array of passive 
sensors detects the resulting sound waves bouncing off enemy submarines. The 
more sensors in the water, the better detection and recognition of type of sub-
marine and the direction the submarine is heading. The DYNAMIC MANTA ex-
ercise used a combination of several Ocean Explorer twenty-one-inch-diameter 
autonomous underwater vehicles and Liquid Robotics’ Wave Gliders to serve as 
communication nodes between ships and autonomous underwater vehicles.
“The key to multi-nation multistatic ASW is information-sharing.” Each par-
ticipant must know where exactly the active sonar source is located. Those data 
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enable each participant to detect the sound source accurately and relocate assets 
to intercept or track the enemy submarine.45
The true advantage illustrated by these annual DYNAMIC MANTA exercises 
was multinational cooperation in conducting multidimensional ASW. A multi-
static ASW system, in cooperation with the United States and Japan, might serve 
South Korea better in its defense against the DPRK threat. Given the open-water 
constraints that Pyongyang and Beijing face, the multinational, multidimen-
sional solution may be Seoul’s better investment, versus the nuclear-submarine 
program.
Artificial Intelligence. AI has the potential to be a major game changer in the 
realm of ASW. The continued development of more-powerful sensors and the 
resulting increase in raw data require powerful AI algorithms to process. AI can 
turn mountains of data into the actionable knowledge that naval leaders need 
to prosecute hostile-submarine threats. Additionally, as the development of un-
manned systems continues, AI increasingly is required to operate them, in both 
friendly and hostile environments. AI provides the potential for unmanned sys-
tems to act in concert with each other. This aspect of AI opens the possibility 
of coordinating a complete multidimensional ASW mission without putting hu-
mans in harm’s way.
FIGURE 13  
MULTIFACETED VIEW OF COOPERATIVE ASW CAPABILITIES
Source: “Navy Communications System Modeling and Simulation,” Scalable Network Technologies, n.d., dev.commswork.com/.
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Researchers at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School recently conducted a 
demonstration using swarm technology. With no human control, two flights 
consisting of ten drones each engaged in an aerial-combat exercise. An algorithm 
called Greedy Shooter controlled each drone. The objective was for a drone to 
maneuver against an opponent to obtain a kill shot.46 This demonstration illus-
trated the power and potential of AI in future military combat; the entire exercise 
proceeded without human intervention or control. Such is the power contained 
in fully autonomous systems, but ethics issues associated with fully autonomous 
weapon systems require serious consideration in the future.
Seoul’s case for acquiring nuclear submarines hinges on the assumption that it 
is a strategic necessity for South Korea to have them. As North Korea develops 
missile submarines and Russia and China deploy new nuclear submarines, 
South Korean officials presume that South Korea should have “corresponding 
military power.”47 Yet in fact, South Korean spending on a nuclear-submarine 
fleet actually may undermine the country’s overall national security, as com-
pared with spending the same amount, or even less, intelligently—on a non-
nuclear ASW force.
Certainly, the projected timeline for deploying the first ROKN nuclear subma-
rines is unreasonable; Seoul would be lucky to deploy before 2035. South Korea 
may reduce that timeline by modifying its existing KSS-III design, but a reason-
able assumption is that the timeline will not shrink significantly. This makes 
acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines a poor response to the current DPRK 
submarine threat.
Furthermore, the seas surrounding South Korea make nuclear-submarine 
operations problematic, at best. The West Sea (Yellow Sea) is too shallow (fifty 
meters deep) for large nuclear submarines. While the East Sea (Sea of Japan), 
with an average depth of 1,500 meters, provides the necessary operating environ-
ment for large nuclear submarines, the addition of a few South Korean nuclear 
submarines there will do little to reduce the DPRK missile-submarine threat; in 
2015, North Korea sallied about fifty submarines simultaneously. Countering 
such a large number of submarines demands higher-quality ASW capabilities 
than a handful of nuclear submarines ever could provide.48
Rather than waste its money on nuclear submarines, South Korea could lock 
down a superior suite of ASW capabilities that would provide multiple mission 
capabilities. A recent study on ASW concluded, “Based on Cold War experi-
ence, some U.S. experts assume that the United States would need to possess five 
SSNs [nuclear-powered attack submarines] to keep track of each Chinese SSBN 
[nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine] at sea.”49 On the basis of that state-
ment, the three to six nuclear submarines the ROKN desires would not meet its 
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requirements; instead, it would need a fleet of fifteen to twenty submarines to deal 
with DPRK and Chinese missile submarines. At a conservative cost of $1.6 billion 
per copy, the ROK defense budget would have to absorb an acquisition cost of 
between $24 and $32 billion; that figure does not include ancillary costs. As noted 
previously, the ROK annual defense budget was approximately $42 billion in 2019. 
Funding for pushing forward down a path toward acquiring nuclear submarines 
would compete with funding demands from the ROK Army and Air Force, put-
ting at risk the ROK’s overall defense posture against the Kim regime.
The better investment of limited ROK defense funds is toward the expansion 
of current ASW assets: frigates, destroyers, diesel-electric and AIP submarines, 
and ASW aircraft. These assets can be acquired for less than a nuclear subma-
rine costs, and Seoul already has the infrastructure to support and maintain 
such assets. The ROK shipbuilding industry would not suffer from the lack of 
a nuclear-submarine program, as the ROKN would be purchasing additional 
conventional-fleet units.
The ROKN should partner with leading technology industries to research and 
field new ASW sensors, both acoustic and nonacoustic. The ROK also must le-
verage the technical expertise that domestic industry is developing in the robotic 
and AI sectors. Combining new technologies with existing ROKN platforms 
would provide a multidimensional ASW capability versus a nuclear-submarine 
program that would provide a single-dimensional response.
As Frank von Hippel charges, “Nuclear submarines are superior for travel to 
distant employment areas, not for tracking a neighbor’s diesel-electric subma-
rines in nearby waters.”50 South Korea is not a global military nation; it is a nation 
with regional security requirements. Producing and operating nuclear subma-
rines would constitute a costly venture that would do little to increase Seoul’s 
national security.
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